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Abstract
Examining the Intersection of Refugee Policies and Contemporary
Protracted Displacement
Christopher Owens
ABSTRACT: Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that
host nations shall not expel or return a refugee to their home nation ‘where his life or freedom
would be threatened.’ However, as demonstrated in three contemporary case studies in
protracted displacement the interests of the sovereign state drive nations to craft strategies to
limit cross-border refugee mobility. The refoulement of refugees escaping drug cartel violence
throughout the Americas, internally displaced Haitians, and Syrian refugees in Jordan are all
‘managed’ by one of two methods. First, some destination nations either strategically blur
refugees into other mobility schemes such economic migrants, illegal immigrants, link refugees
to terrorist groups or nations outright replace the term refugee with words like guest. The benefit
of this nomenclature strategy avoids refugee ‘laws’ altogether. The second strategy outright
prevents the need to refoule by regulating or outright stopping refugee border crossings
altogether. The border control strategy allows for refugee considerations, however prevents the
host nation from engaging in Article 33 violations. Regardless of the strategy, host nations create
policies that prioritize the protection and sovereignty of the host nations over the needs of
individual refugees and the growing number of refugees in protracted displacement situations.
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Introduction and Formulation of Thesis
Protracted Displacement is largely overlooked by international refugee agreements. Therefore, the
very structure of refugee policies in place may be causative to perpetuating protracted
displacement. Having spent a number of years working in direct support of US immigration
policies, I approached this topic with a focused personal curiosity. Throughout the Caribbean and
Pacific, I served in the US Coast Guard conducting among other missions, Alien Migration
Interdiction Operations (AMIO) in support of larger directives through the Department of
Homeland Security and national policies. This mission set encompasses a wide swath of mobility
schemes, including illegal human trafficking, illegal immigration and refugee migration.
Generally, successful interdictions included the immediate provision of food and healthcare and
ended with repatriation to nations of origin. At the ‘deck-plate level’ in the field this was often
approached without vast knowledge of national immigration policies, but rather as a humanitarian
mission that ultimately saved the lives of people at sea. I frequently found my curiosity returning
to questions about desperation, motives and (for those not victims of human smuggling) the
decisions made to willingly partake in life-threatening sea and land crossings. This academically
evolved into deeper questions related to the intersection of national policies and personal motives
of human mobility.

I agree with many who have been critically examining diaspora and policies. For instance, Fábos
and Brun (2016) conclude that “the international system is hopelessly disordered” in the approach
to protracted displacement. I would add to that by suggesting that the continuous creation and
application of more refugee ‘lingo’ by UNHCR and multi-national policies only perpetuates the
phenomenon and globally socializes the idea that an increasing number of people are forced into
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statelessness. The term protracted displacement itself may be an acknowledgement of the
normalization of large numbers of people on the move rather than part of a stable nation-state. The
world watched for the first time in 2016 as new population was represented in the Summer
Olympic Games entering not under the flag of a sovereign nation, but as a group of athletes without
a safe home nation. This served as a shockingly numb acknowledgement that displacement is
becoming normalized in the global discourse of refugees. This problem is no longer contained any
one hemisphere. Rather the globe is becoming more connected through growing mobilization
while recent trends show increased ‘othering’ of people in the developing world.

Whether caused by natural disasters or human conflict, there are multiple conditions that have
created large groups of people to enter a life of forced migration, protracted displacement, or both.
Consequently, there has been an equal growth in the public discourse surrounding human mobility
in the contemporary nation-state context. The terms refugee, migrant, displacement and immigrant
all have some shared concepts, but also separate meanings in the domain of national and
international policy and humanitarian rights. And should be considered as such. The causes of
displacement range from inter- and intra-state conflicts to environmental conditions and this
contributes to how displacement is calculated. However, the public discourse surrounding mobility
often uses the terms refugee, migrant, immigrant, and illegal alien interchangeably and often
neglects the both the different legalities and motives behind mobility schemes.
The distinction between populations, motives and mobility is often lost in
public discourse:
An Immigrant is an individual who leaves one’s country to settle in another, whereas refugees are
defined as persons, who move out of one’s country due to restriction or danger to their lives.
Immigration is considered a natural phenomenon in population ecology, whereas the refugee
movement occurs only under some kind of coercion or pressure.
- diffen.com
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Reviewing the applicable sources documents regarding refugees, primarily the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol as well as other regional agreements, finds that they were in large part reactive
measures to specific contexts. That is, they were not built from macro-level diagnoses of refugee
issues which are akin to the contemporary global protracted displacement situations (PRS).
Further, the United Nations cannot make policy compulsory, but rather “centre for harmonizing
the actions of nations” (UN Charter, Article 1, Chapter 1). Therefore, I contend that refugee
agreements have become universal aspirations rather than enforceable laws or regulations. The
overarching question I pose for my case studies will be; How are the aspirations of international
refugee policies being applied by nations in the contemporary – and now very globalized – contexts
of protracted displacement?

Methodology. For the purposes of this research I will present a precis or summary of contemporary
protracted displacement through historical - and therefore structural - refugee policies. Drawing
an exact picture of the global state of protracted displacement is an approximate and incomplete
exercise – in part because the number of globally-displaced people is dynamic, but also because
each situation of protracted displacement has its own unique context. The literature review
demonstrates an evolution of the concept of refugee as well as the international policies driven by
UN conventions and signatories. This includes the historical contexts that propelled the United
Nations and sovereign states to develop a language complete with legal definitions surrounding
displacement. The main body of the research will then center on three case studies of protracted
displacement. Each case study will have variances in the drivers of displacement, geography of
the nation-states involved, and cultural influences. However, variances aside, I will present some
level of examination of the way the rights of the sovereign nation-state and the individual human
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rights are expressed in the enactment of policy. Also, there will be considerations made to how
each situation demonstrates an application of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Concerning
Refugees.

Understanding Protracted Displacement through Policy
The term refugee and the idea of ‘refugee-ness.’ In virtually all domains of international
relations, whether it be economic, political or cultural, the growing number of refugees and
displaced persons is a discussion point that has significant political and economic impacts.
Understanding displacement in the international system begins with the origin of not just the term
refugee, but the history behind individual and group displacement from the nation-state. Also, it is
essential to differentiate between a migrant and a refugee, both in motives of the individual and
the policies of the nation-state. For over thirty-years policy makers and researchers have been
differentiating between a refugee and a migrant partially because “the intent of the refugee is to
return to his or her homeland once conditions have returned to normal,” and “a refugee must be
responding to push factors rather than pull factors” (Hyuck and Bouvier, 1983 pg. 40). This
understanding of refugee has well-documented historical contexts however may have morphed in
the public discourse over the past thirty years. But again, for the purposes of this examination,
because I intend to focus on those people who are in a state of protracted displacement, and are
therefore – by legal definition and personal experience - a refugee and specifically not a migrant,
economic migrant or illegal alien.

The difference between a refugee and any other type of migrant marks a crucial distinction for
countries receiving new arrivals Martinez (2015), but also in the personal experience that led to
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displacement or movement. Conceptually, refugees leave their home nation – often by forced
choice rather than free will – where failure to leave would likely result in destructive consequences
(Hyuck and Bouvier, 1983, pg. 40). Whereas a migrant’s motives are largely economic or cultural
without the fear of harm; their travel is thereby free choice. I argue that ‘free choice’ or ‘free will’
is not the same as ‘forced’ or ‘coerced’ choice. Again, migrants make a choice to move based on
free will and a desire for ‘something better,’ whereas a refugee or forcibly displaced person is
doing so as a means of basic survival. The overlapping ideas around forced migration are also
considerable because for thousands of people – who make life and death decisions about their
mobility do so absent of any concern about whether or not they are, in legal terms, an asylee,
refugee or forced migrant in the eyes of the law. A significant step in that determination is based
on interviews and personal narratives from the person escaping violence to determine if they meet
the legal constructs of a refugee or a migrant. Reflecting on this idea, anecdotally I ask: When an
armed assailant enters a crowded room brandishing a gun, who pauses consider their future ‘status’
before leaving the room and who would just run out the closest door? Would anyone pause to
question how the police would later require them to provide proof that their fear of danger was
legitimate or inaccurately perceived to be real? In short, people in danger do not consider the legal
ramifications of their protective natures. Regardless of the legal definition, forced migration or
refugee-ness is instinctual ‘fight or flight.’

Refugee Policies. While refugee laws are articulated – and generally accepted - ultimately I seek
to understand how those laws interact with people’s protracted displacement, whether internal or
cross-border. It is the policies themselves I suggest are compelling, not just the social constructs
of ‘refugee-ness.’ Each sovereign nation, whether a signatory of the international conventions or
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not, have both the responsibility and right to control their borders. The difference between asylees
and refugees is fundamentally determined by procedure (alllaw.com). And these procedures vary.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "The practice of
granting asylum to people fleeing persecution in foreign lands is one of the earliest hallmarks of
civilization" (unhcr.org). Policies of the modern world reacted accordingly and increased the
importance of a person’s ‘status’ or citizenship in a nation. Without citizenship in a sovereign
nation, this also created the concept of ‘statelessness.’ Literally, if a person intentionally leaves
their state, crossing a border into a nation that they hold no citizenship, they must fall under a legal
definition that explains their ‘status’ in the new nation as some type of migrant or refugee.

Historical benchmarks in refugee policy followed the evolution of Western Civilization into
modernity. The Treaty of Versailles, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and multiple regional agreements are
all reactions of international conflicts that created refugees (Adelman, pg. 87, 1999). The outcomes
of refugee policies ideally focus on two forces; (1) to uphold the sovereignty and security the
nation-state and (2) to support basic human rights of the individual refugee living in a state of
protracted displacement. The UN calls the 1951 Refugee Convention “the key legal document that
forms the basis of our work” (unhcr.org). For the signatory states of the convention it not only
defined the term refugee, but also outlined the rights of displaced people and the legal obligations
of all states that agree protect them. Article One of the Convention defines refugees. Paragraph
one of this article upholds previous understanding about people agreed upon under previous
conventions and agreements from 1928, 1933, 1938 and 1939, demonstrating that the United
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Nations Convention of 1951 acknowledged a contemporary geopolitical reality, but historical
realities as well. Paragraph two of Article One the 1951 Convention declares:
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

Here again, it is important to recognize the specific context of the Post-WWII era and the beginning
of the Cold War specified in the paragraph above. The 1967 Protocol was the next international
discussion surrounding refugee law and attempted to address both their human rights and their
needs as citizens of the world (unhcr.org). The 1967 Protocol moved beyond much of the historical
and geographic restrictions allowing nations to address contemporary refugees. Under the 1967
Protocol, nations which had previously ratified the 1951 Convention and chose to use
geographically defined restrictions to define refugees, now had the option to retain or remove that
restriction (unhcr.org). Again, however, there was an overarching theme related to the growth of
the Cold War and ‘East-West’ geopolitical circumstances. These policies were reactions to specific
changes in the geopolitical schemes of their time, and not necessarily representative of progressive
moral approaches to humanity.

In international terms, displacement refers to people who are forcibly displaced as a result of armed
conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters. This includes refugees who have crossed one or more borders, internally displaced
persons (IDPs) and other ‘persons of concern’ to UNHCR, such as asylum-seekers and stateless
people (UNHCR, 2012). In January 2011, The University of Oxford Refugee Studies Centre
produced Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations; Lessons from a Decade of Discussion.
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This document sought to “highlight the very best and latest policy-relevant research findings”
related to forced migration. It also outlines, that the conclusions are not legally binding, rather a
consensus of opinions based on their research aimed to respond to Protracted Refugee Situations
(PRS) effectively. After acknowledging that PRS is defined as one in which refugees are displaced
for greater than five years and “without immediate prospects of implementation of durable
solutions,” this report was direct when it argued that nearly two-thirds of the world’s refugees are
in a state of “seemingly unending exile” and (pg. 3). The complications of protracted displacement
and refugees are not regional, but global. The depth and breadth of contemporary protracted
displacement can be measured in all parts of the world. Refugees in protracted displacement need
not just protection from harm, but at the current scope are also a global collective-goods problem
(Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011, pg. 434), for the host nations that accept them. In large measure,
nations that house refugees – certainly in numbers of greater than twenty-five thousand and for
more than five years – are carrying the burden of the economic cost, protection, and provision of
civil rights that the home nation failed to provide.

Rights of the Displaced Individual. Citizens of a nation-state have rights accorded to them by
their state leadership. Individual rights of a citizen vary when considering access to services or
protection provided by the government, but include some level of human rights. Adelman (1999)
argues that while “refugees are the products of modernity” (pg. 83), modernity divided the world
into nation-states that assumed the responsibility for the protection of citizens that reside within
those borders. Further, the modern international global society became a way to unify the
understanding of basic human rights across cultures. When the globe became partitioned by
sovereign borders – dividing or combining people by religious, cultural or ethnic similarities – the
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contemporary idea of universal human rights came into being.

In the contemporary context, human rights can be defined. Article 48 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that everyone has a right, among other things, to nationality. This is a basic
concept – and an inherent understanding – of what it means to be a citizen of a nation. Brun (2003)
provides some plain-language explanation, stating that the common understanding of citizenship
“stresses the principles of sameness, such as equal rights and equal treatment for all members in
the nation-state” (pg. 378). Rights to life, to marry and rear children, to build a home, to have
access to food, water and economic growth all make up the varying components of human rights
– and rights as a citizen. This serves as a decent ‘entry point’ for us to examine the rights of an
individual in the context of the contemporary international system. However, equal rights and
treatment is often illusive.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 guaranteed a “... right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution,” and forbade indiscriminate deprivation of nationality.
The Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 defined refugees and afforded them specific rights.
More importantly, the convention prohibited their refoulement (or forcible return) from the
countries where they sought refuge (Article 33). This was driven at least partially, by the growing
number of Europeans caught on the wrong side of the East/West division of Europe by Communist
Soviet nations and the Democratic Western nations. Cold War considerations combined with a
vacuum of labor in industries such as mining led Britain, Australia and other countries to grant
many from Poland and others permanent settlement outside the Soviet Block.
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Sovereignty of the Host State. Any examination of historical contexts of displacement would be
remiss if they did not also include the role of the nation-state. Geopolitically speaking, the nationstate is one where citizens are conscious of a common identity and share the same culture
(Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011). Or, another view suggests the ideal of 'nation-state' is that the
state incorporates people of a single ethnic stock and cultural traditions (Kazancigil and Dogan,
1986. Pg. 188). In reality, virtually every contemporary nation is polyethnic to some extent, leaving
the geopolitical definition truly non-existent (Baylis and Smith, 1997). This can contribute to
assertions that the idea of the ethnically homogenous nation-state is increasingly problematic as
the state is no longer seen as the focus of national culture (Delanty, 1996). Nevertheless, the nationstate does have both sovereignty and rights to its own governance. Accordingly, one challenge
facing the contemporary multi-cultural state is to maintain both the inherent identity of the
citizenship contained within national borders while simultaneously participating in the greater
global society. This, I contend, includes not just a universal understanding human rights, but also
the economy, civil representation and security of the nation-state.

Progressing into modernity, the expectation that people can govern themselves became
synonymous with the idea that nation-states should determine their own destiny. Today, the idea
is that nations should be represented within a territorially defined state by the body of government
that the citizens themselves have put in place, either by process or by cultural or social traditions.
Regardless of makeup, without a firm base of citizen rights, protection and identity,
multiculturalism can undergo confrontations from nationalism, often as a result of social insecurity
(unesco.org). Generally, resistance to liberal refugee and asylum policies center around decreased
national security, economic instability, unbalanced or unskilled labor and cultural norms. Refugees
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are often categorized as less capable than traditional migrants. Yet others see refugees entering
another nation merely for the social services. Critics of that resistance counter with accusations of
nationalism, elitism or racism. Yet some estimates are on average, a country has to spend well over
one hundred thousand dollars per person to support an asylum seeker until their claim is settled
(Nie, 2015). This leaves the host nation taxpayers with a significant financial burden.
The State
Soveriengty
National/Cultural Identity
Legislative Processes
Service to Citizens
Border Control
Economic Stability

The Individual
Legal Protection
Cultural Identity
Citizenship or "status"
Economic Opportunity
Physical Safety
Citizenship

Evolving from Policies to Solutions. Almost one hundred years after the end of the First World
War, the UNHCR began a discussion in Geneva to identify gaps in refugee policy. By 2010 the
United Nations Human Rights Commissioner (UNHCR) concentrated refugee reduction efforts
into a solutions-based focus. The Durable Solutions were developed to create a desired end state
for the refugee. For conflict-driven refugees, the UN Secretary-General advocated for the “primary
role of the State in facilitating durable solutions for displacement” (UN Durable Solutions
Preliminary Operational Guide, pg. 9). The contemporary UNHCR focus is to resolve refugee
issues in one of three outcomes.

First, and ideally, UNHCR seeks displacement resolution by Voluntary Return (or Repatriation).
According to the UHNCR Handbook on Durable Solutions, return “is voluntary, free from
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coercion, and based on objective information” (UNHCR, pg. 191). Support for the return of
refugees with physical, legal and material safety and with full restoration of national protection is
seen as the ideal solution. This would require that refugees are able to return to their home nation
without persecution as outlined in the articles of the 1951 Convention. The second Durable
Solution is Local Integration (UNHCR, pg. 193). The goal is for displaced people to be integrated
in the country of “first asylum” (pg. 193). Again, the 1951 Convention provides a framework that
establishes expectations for the host nation and the refugee. This includes access to legal rights,
economic growth and social services. Lastly, and frequently least desired, is Resettlement (pg.
197). The resettlement of refugees to a third country where they can enjoy long-term protection
and integrate into a nation where they did not first seek asylum is more complicated and requires
the cooperation of multiple nations. The UNHCR acknowledges that this solution offers resolve
for refugees with unique circumstances, particularly “those with limited prospects for local
integration or voluntary repatriation, or for those with specific needs who cannot find adequate
protection in the country of origin or the country of asylum” (pg. 197). This measure requires
nations frequently geographically and culturally distant from the refugee’s home nation to provide
processes for integration.

The UN recommends Resident Humanitarian Coordinators (RHCs) be granted “the responsibility
of leading the process of durable solutions strategy development for IDPs and returning refugees”
to their home nations (UN Durable Solutions, pg. 9). In October 2011, the UN Secretary-General
adopted a Decision on Durable Solutions and an accompanying Preliminary Framework on
Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict. This affirms the primary role of the State in
facilitating durable solutions for displacement. On the international side, it delegates
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“Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) the responsibility of leading the process of
durable solutions strategy development for IDPs and returning refugees, determining the most
appropriate approach based on consultation with national authorities and partners.” (UN Durable
Solutions Preliminary Operational Guide, pg. 9). This is a significant addition to the original
language of 1951 that only referenced nation-states as actors providing refugee rights and
processes.

I suspect what was historically approached as short term refugee situations will continue in a
globalized framework to become increasingly protracted. The temporariness of the refugee will
become a growing global population composed of stateless people and people without agency in
their home nation. Zetter (2011) stated that the conception of the label ‘protracted displacement’
implies a “state of exception” and situations such as this depart from some common refugee crisis.
Further, he suggests the contemporary contexts of protracted displacement will become the norm.
Displaced populations themselves increasingly resist formal national or international initiatives to
provide solutions. The UNHCR produces staggering statistics that highlight the growth of global
displacement:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

In 2014 13.9 million people became newly displaced – four times the number of the previous year.
Worldwide there were 19.5 million refugees (up from 16.7 million in 2013)
38.2 million were displaced inside their own countries (up from 33.3 million in 2013)
1.8 million people were awaiting the outcome of claims for asylum (against 1.2 million in 2013).
65.3 million people were displaced at the end of 2015, compared to 59.5 million just 12 months earlier.
Over half the world’s displaced people are children.
Syria is the world’s biggest producer of both internally displaced people (7.6 million) and refugees (3.88
million at the end of 2014). Afghanistan (2.59 million) and Somalia (1.1 million) are the next biggest
refugee source countries.
86% of refugees are in regions and countries considered economically less developed.
40.8 million people who had been forced to flee their homes but were within the confines of their own
countries demonstrating the significance of internally displaced people (IDPs).
Three nations had the largest numbers of internally displaced people: Colombia at 6.9 million, Syria at 6.6
million and Iraq at 4.4 million.
Source: unhcr.org
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The progression of policies related to refugee and displacement took into consideration the
individual rights and protections that displacement from a home nation creates. There are general
overarching principles outlined such as “the wish that all states, recognizing the social and
humanitarian nature or the problem of refugees” and the goal to “assure refugees the widest
possible exercise… …of these fundamental rights and freedoms” as outlined in the preamble of
the 1951 Convention. This language maintains the overarching understanding of human rights
agreed upon by all signatory nations. There are specifics as well. For instance, as Crisp (2004)
points out, in the Conventions there was space created not just for integration of those displaced,
but also opportunities for citizenship into new nations (pg. 3). Article 34 of the 1951 Convention
states that signatory states “shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees” and “expedite naturalization proceedings.” And Article 16 specifies that refugees “shall
have free access to the courses of law on the territory of all Contracting States” ensuring legal
representation for all persons.

The 1951 Convention includes language that also addresses the processes and sovereignty of the
state. Article 12 addresses the Personal Status of individual refugees, allowing that stateless
refugee status shall be governed “by the law of the country of his residence.” Establishing the
responsibility of refugees to adhere to host nations’ particular legal systems, Article 2 states that
refugees “conform to [the] laws and regulations as well as measures taken for the maintenance of
public order.” In regional contexts this is important. For consideration of polities that focus on
state and individual benefits or rights, the Schengen and Dublin Conventions aspired to do both.
The 1990 Schengen Convention “aimed to reinforce external border controls [by] allowing free
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movement within participating states” (Turton, 2002). The 1990 Dublin Convention also aimed to
create a common set of criteria for EU nations to determine asylum claims. This ensured that one
state would take responsibility for a claim, thereby preventing asylum-seekers from moving
between nations to find a most favorable place to seek asylum. Essentially, once a claim is made
the asylum seeker is prevented from moving between nations or applying for asylum elsewhere.
This became binding for all signatory EU nations in 1997.

As in other regions of the world, Europe has made both advances, and setbacks regarding refugee
needs. Europe has been a center of gravity for refugees from other parts of the world, most recently
the Middle East, and each nation has taken on varying amounts of people. Germany, for instance,
has been open to refugees as a benefit to their labor force, where the UK has been less open to
unrestricted refugee processing. In the public discourse, the influx of refugees into the UE has been
connected to the UK’s ‘BREXIT” vote of 2016 (Hall, 2015; Wilkinson, 2016; rt.com, 2016, and
Devine, 2015). Public discourse is often influenced by media reports and can even take on a life
of its own. However, it is incumbent on the state to separate discourse from reality when crafting
policies. Again, there are states needs and individual needs to be balanced.

It is worth specifically identifying that displacement has become increasingly globalized. It has
globalized the public discourse about both the populations that are moving and the policies nations
develop. And it has globalized in terms of mobility schemes. Aside from the global approach to
refugees and the policies of the international community, there are significant regional contexts as
well. This provides another layer of examination related to the overarching question I posed at the
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beginning: How are the aspirations of refugee policies being applied by nations in the
contemporary – and now very globalized – contexts of protracted displacement?

The argument to combine climatedisplaced

or

disaster-displaced

people under policy umbrellas
exists

mainly

discourse

in

the

(Abdulla,

public
2014).

Equally, displacement out of a
home

nation

versus

internal

displacement also complicates the
overall

picture

of

refugees.

Bakewell (2005) references Cohen and DeWind who suggest “internally displaced persons should
be brought into the picture and should be considered in parallel with refugees” (as cited by
Bakewell, pg. 15). From a humanistic approach, regardless of the causation, the plight of the
refugee is no or more less a strain from either the position of the individual refugee or the nationstate system.

Contemporary Case Studies in Protracted Displacement
While not every nation is a signatory, the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol are to date, the most
widely accepted and internationally agreed upon documents regarding refugees. Regional
adaptations have been created and states have adopted national policies that clearly follow the
language set forth in these early discussions. If the 1951 UN Convention can be considered the
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‘baseline’ for subsequent refugee policies then the provisions within the convention create realistic
guidelines as to the mechanics of refugee treatment, rights and processes. More than identification
of definitions of terms the 1951 Convention, authored and endorsed by international
representatives, outlined specific goals for nations that receive refugees. Within the articles of the
convention explicit needs – for the state and the refugee - were addressed.

As stated earlier, nations hosting refugees are provided ‘protection’ of their own sovereignty
through specific articles which lay a groundwork of sorts for the ‘relationship’ between the refugee
and contracting state. Again, Article 2 frames this by ensuring refugees “to conform to its laws
and regulations as well as to measure taken for the maintenance of public order.” This establishes
an understanding that the state’s legal systems be acknowledged by the refugee. Article 3 protects
the ‘identity’ so to speak, of the refugee stating “The Contracting States shall apply the provisions
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”
Together, the articles ideally sustain refugee rights and the authority of the state’s judicial system
correspondingly.

While a complete examination of refugee succor would be ideal, for this paper it is more important
to conduct a review of differing national or regional policies in regards to access to rights and
needs. It would be more realistic to find one component of refugee or displacement policy and use
that as a point of comparison. Both the juridical status of the contracting state and refugee’s access
to legal processes are categorically addressed in Chapter II, articles 12 through 16. This provides
expectations of property rights, rights of association and access to courts – all with the intent to
maintain some level of good order both for the host nation and the refugee. Goodwin-Gill (2014)
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summarizes how dissimilar understandings and agreements have been made in relation to national
labor markets and international migrant workers. For instance, while the 1951 UN Convention
Chapter III specifically aspires to create refugee access to economic independence, there is no
specific reference to labor or employment rights in the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Refugee Convention of 1969. Therefore, Goodwin-Gill and others find that regionally not all
‘refugee rights’ documents provide equally comparable access to jobs or economies.

The many contexts for state/refugee rights and relations would be too exhaustive or dissimilar in
execution for the case studies I have chosen for this research. Also, the three contemporary
examples of protracted displacement I intend to examine have such uniqueness that it would be
best to find some parallel to compare them, to create an ‘apples-to-apples’ comparison. Returning
to the main question for this paper, if the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have become
universal aspirations rather than enforceable laws or regulations, then how are the aspirations of
refugee policies being applied by nations in the contemporary – and now very globalized – contexts
of protracted displacement?

First, I will examine how, in each context, a balance between the rights of the individual refugee
are balanced with the rights of the host state. There should be some evidence through policy-driven
decisions that illustrate how the sovereignty of the state, control of borders, protection of economic
interests or impact on population are balanced with the provisions made to ensure the rights of the
displaced population. Utilization the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol as well as any regional
agreements such as the 1984 Cartagena Agreement and national policies should demonstrate how
state rights and individual rights are addressed.
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Secondly, within the articles of the 1951 Convention, being accepted as the framework for
provision of all refugee or displaced person’s rights, there are multiple aspects for comparison.
Refugee access to economy is difficult because the nations where displaced persons reside differ
in import/exports, industrial base or labor laws. Likewise, access to legal systems also includes
variances between nations. Article 33 “Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (Refoulement)” of the
1951 Convention provides a context for comparison that avoids variances between national laws.
An ‘apples-to-apples’ comparison can be made in contemporary protracted displacement situations
and how this particular article is implemented. ARTICLE 33: Prohibition of Expulsion or Return
(Refoulement) states:
1. No Contracting State Shall expel or return (“refoule”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

And
2. The Benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a ganger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
the community of that country.

Examining contemporary protracted displacement situations through the lens of Article 33 can be
informative in terms of ‘state logic’ but also contextualize how the UNHCR’s Durable Solution of
Voluntary Return is approached. For instance, national policies may use specific terms such as
‘repatriate,’ ‘refoule,’ ‘deport’ or ‘expel’ to define how displaced persons are returned to their
nation of origin, especially related to Article 33, paragraph 2.
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Case Study 1: Internally Displaced Haitians. (See appendix A)
Protracted Displacement Situation: After 7 years, an estimated 150,000 Haitians reside in multiple
domestic camps or informal communities.
Cause(s): 2010 Earthquake and the subsequent environmental degradation from hurricanes. Poor
infrastructure. Weak Governance.
Distinction: Mobility options limited to one land border or by sea. Haitian government resistance to
continued occupation of camps.
Article 33 Considerations: Multiple nations participate in either accepting or returning refugees back to
Haiti. This includes the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean Island Nations and virtually all South,
Central and North American nations – principally Brazil and the United States.

Summary: Immediately after the January 2010 earthquake, thousands of Haitians were displaced
and began occupying numerous spontaneous camps. Based on their size and population, at least
three of these camps could still easily be called tent cities after seven years. Although UN ‘Shelter
experts’ created plans, few were implemented. In some cases, the land where these camps reside
are now being sought by the Haitian government as new economic development opportunities.
Residents of the camps report that the Haitian government is pressuring them to leave the camps.

While the immediate cause of internal protracted displacement in Haiti directly correlates to a
series of natural disasters, there exists a relevant historical perspective that extends back to the
nation’s origins. By the 1970s and 1980s political instability was widely considered a significant
contributor to Haiti’s inability to rebuild infrastructure damaged from seasonal hurricanes. For
decades, Haitians have illegally migrated to escape Haiti not just because of poverty, but political
unrest. Since the earthquake, the Haitian government has used economic aid from the international
community to build at least two fully-functioning communities to re-house the displaced.
However, the locations of the communities are too remote for residents to access jobs. Also, rent
structures prevent Haitians from affording them.

Surrounding nations, specifically Dominican Republic and the United States, have been targets for
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Haitians, and as such both nations have taken proactive and reactive policy measures. For instance,
the US has from one time or another, created policies that allowed Haitian immigrants, but not
Haitian asylum seekers. Even before the 2010 earthquake, US policies towards Haitian refugees
have been flexible. Because asylum in the US can only be claimed once within the US (uscis.gov),
turning refugees back at sea is a less complicated process. Policies have ranged from acceptance
of Haitian refugees based on annual quotas, to agency directives aiming to “enforce the suspension
of the entry of undocumented migrants by interdicting them at sea, and return them to their country
of origin or departure.” Haitians who cross the land border with the Dominican Republic illegally
have been either involuntarily returned or been taken in as part of slave labor in agriculture.
Historically, Haitians who reach the Bahamas have faced physical beatings by government
authorities before being returned involuntarily to Haiti. Still other Haitian refugees find their way
to Brazil to either resettle or become absorbed in the land migration of Latin Americans into North
America.

Case Study 2: Displaced Latin Americans across the Americas (See appendix B)
Protracted Displacement Situation: Discretely living without housing or camps throughout South,
Central and North America. Detention Centers.
Cause(s): Multinational drug cartel violence. Statelessness.
Distinction: Multinational refugee population mixed with ‘traditional’ economic migrants.
Article 33 Considerations: Virtually all nations in South, Central and North America have some level of
policy to either accept or return refugees across borders.

Summary: Estimates of displacement exist. Academics and officials in the region struggle to
accurately create disaggregated data that can comprehensively define where refugees are
displaced. This is because, attempting to escape many refugees intentionally do so discretely to
avoid recapture by cartels or refoulement by governments. Data that is produced is in the hundreds
of thousands and can span nearly two-decades of significant violence and homicide rates.
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Latin American refugees are very diversified in their composition. While many Latin American
refugees are political refugees the increased violence of drug cartels, specifically their use of slave
labor and inter-cartel violence over territory and smuggling routes, have created larger numbers of
refugees. Also, contributing to the violence, the government interventions have caused significant
risks of life to civilians. Studies conducted in Mexico and Columbia specifically, demonstrate the
overall stability that exists in many nations.

Regional policies exist, but there is little data to prove any effectiveness. For instance, while
Mexico is occupied by refugees traveling north into the US, only two out of thirty-two Mexican
states have any form of refugee legislation of any kind. Central American governments have been
accused of ignoring the refugee problem because it makes it easier to hide the regional apathy
towards a humanitarian problem or that they lack the effective governance to respond. However,
the 2014 Brazil Declaration and its ten-year Plan of Action is the first international agreement that
recognized organized crime as a cause of large-scale displacement.

To the north, the US and Canadian policies attempt to manage the refugee migration. Like what
the EU is experiencing, the public discourse expresses concerns that US refugee policies towards
Latin Americans are racist or alarmist (Piccato and Finchelstein, 2016), the border security
concerns in North America have some basis of legitimacy. In-depth reporting such as Midnight on
the Line (2009) as well as academic research present well-documented threats of violence against
state and federal law enforcement personnel as cartels expand into the southern states. Cartels have
been shown to enter the US not just to expand distribution routes, but to recapture escaped refugees
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(Kilmer et al, 2010; Nazario, 2014; and Mountz, 2010). However, because the liberal acceptance
of refugees has become so pervasive, it is seen as a collective goods problem for those nations that
absorb them (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011). Since 2004 the United States and Canada have
shared The Safe Third Country Agreement, which allows a smoother processing of refugee claims
from claimants seeking entry into Canada from the US. In the past Canada's acceptance of Latin
American Refugees has been generous, however that assumes that the refugees bypass or pass
through the US on their way farther north. Canadian policies have also been tightened in attempts
to discourage economic refugees from falsely claiming refugee status. In the US, the flow of Latin
American refugees is regularly mixed with a discourse about illegal aliens. Without understating
the obvious, the US response to Latin American refugees will continue to fluctuate with political
tides.

Specifically related to Article 33 considerations, the US response can be measured by nongovernment actors to police the US-Mexican borders. Civilians structured in quasi-military groups
are not necessarily well-versed in refugee policies or asylum law. However, they are positioned
along the border directly interacting with refugees that, under the 1951 Convention, are afforded
basic human rights as well as international rights. Those refugees who safely enter the US are
placed in Detention Centers while their claims are process. These closed camps are de-facto
prisons.

Case Study 3: Displaced Syrians in Jordan (See appendix C)
Protracted Displacement Situation: Over 600,000 in Jordanian camps, informal communities, and living
in Amman out of 4 million total (numbers are dynamic) displaced Syrians worldwide.
Cause(s): Civil War
Distinction: All displaced people in Jordan are ‘guests’ of the Kingdom of Jordan.
Article 33 Considerations: 70,000 displaced along the Jordanian border at “the berms.”
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Summary: In the era of the First and Second World Wars, new borders of Iraq, Syria, the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were all created. As a result, traditional
social and familial networks shaped migration and inter-mixing patterns of people within the
Levant far more prolifically than in other parts of the globe making cross-borders movement
customary. To that point, Jordan has been a haven for Muslim refugees from Lebanon, Iraq and
Palestine, significantly increasing its population.

The inception of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 created a complex humanitarian aid issue that has
been largely allowed to persist by the international community. The UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs declared it an emergency creating a generation of Syrians
without a functioning civil society. Syrians remaining in Syria have faced a complete degradation
of basic services, a chemical weapons attack by its government, and influx of extremist
organizations, aerial bombings, and even a polio outbreak. By November 2015, the UNHCR
reported that over a four million Syrian "persons of concern” both inside out of Syria. While many
Syrians have travelled north into the EU, North America and even Australia, for this examination,
I will focus on those that aim for Jordan.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that by 2016 over two hundred
thousand people have been killed in the ongoing conflict, including over sixty thousand civilians
killed by Assad’s military forces. Though the use of cellular phones and social media, refugees
have made mobility decisions based on the first-person reporting of Syrians who left before them.
All Syrians are aware that returning to their home nation – and thereby satisfying a ‘durable
solution’ – is wholly perilous for the foreseeable future.
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While Syrians have made their way into the EU, many face deportation and a complex public
opinion of refugee policies. Of the Syrians in Jordan, twenty percent are living in refugee camps
located in or near Za'atari, Marjeeb al-Fahood, Cyber City and Al-Azraq (unhcr.org). Roughly
eighty percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan reside outside camps in urban settings or rural
informal communities (Al Akash, 2015, pg. 48 and Kelberer, 2015). The Kingdom of Jordan has
allowed that if Syrian refugees are able to establish family ties to a Jordanian, they are then allowed
to live outside the Azraq camp in an informal community and build homes. Around the camp, aid
agencies have centralized their distribution of resources, including a school for Syrian children.

The Syrian community outside Azraq is remotely located in the eastern area of Jordan adjacent to
a military base used for airstrikes inside Syria. Of Syrians living outside camps in towns and cities
tens of thousands are in “substandard shelters” (Kelberer, 2016) where aid agencies put their
efforts into basic shelter needs and developing the housing market for refugees. According to the
2015 shelter response plan, the UNHCR worked with the Kingdom of Jordan to increase
construction of more housing units with has been problematic both in terms of financial resources
and social harmony with Jordanian citizens. Access to the Jordanian economy has also been
problematic for many Syrians and those who are unable to obtain employment or aid are
increasingly returning to Syria as the conflict continues.

Not all Syrians ever make it into Jordan, however, an are living in an expanding tent city in an area
called ‘the berms’ located in a remote area on the eastern border at Rukban. According the
UNHCR, the number of tent shelters grew from roughly three hundred to eight thousand in a year
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and the number of refugees has surpassed seventy-thousand. The Kingdom of Jordan has used this
access point to regulate the flow of Syrian refugees into the country and has considered this a
problem for the international community. Jordanian officials have put the number of those stranded
at the border at more than 100,000, but there are reports of Syrians leaving the makeshift camp
back to their homes. Exact numbers of refugees at the border fluctuate by date and reporting source,
however satellite images readily available online demonstrate the scope and desperation of the
situation.

Discussion
The three examples of contemporary protracted displacement, Haiti, Latin America and Syrians in
Jordan all present contrasts. Where the story of Syrians and Latin Americans demonstrate a crossborder displacement in a host nation, displaced Haitians are largely internally displaced. And while
Haitians and Latin Americans share a common diaspora into North America, the Syrian population
seeks out multiple host nation destinations across the globe. The Syrians reaching Jordan have
done so based on a decision not to head north into the EU through Turkey or across the
Mediterranean, or through flight-assisted movement to nations such as the US or Australia. Latin
American refugees largely travel north by land. Haitians have only two choices; into the
Dominican Republic by foot, or life-risking boat travel to the north or west.

What the three populations share, however, are more significant. Refugees face the hard decision
to leave their home nation, intermingle with ‘traditional’ economic migrant flows and enter the
international realm of refugee policies. And then there is the protracted-ness of their displacement.
These commonalities are where the comparison of Article 33 and State-versus-Individual become
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apparent. In Haiti, across Latin America and in Jordan, displaced people eventually desire to return
to their home. However, until it is safe to do so, they ultimately place their host nations and the
international community to consider how to balance the humane treatment of displaced individuals
with the needs of the sovereign state.

Article 33 Considerations. The Kingdom of Jordan has largely avoided the need to refoule
Syrians by maintaining positive control of the numbers they allow into Jordan. This has contributed
in the generation of a separate humanitarian crisis as Syrians ‘pile up’ at the remote border.
UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies struggle to provide water and food and security. The
number of Syrians admitted into Jordan is dynamic and allows the Kingdom to simultaneously act
with magnanimity in the Islamic region and maintain neutrality in the civil war. By comparison,
the global discourse surrounding Syrian refugees has created scrutiny for EU nations.

As for Haitians, the US has taken an ‘intercept at sea’ approach, preventing Haitians from making
it to dry land on other islands. I can speak first hand to this mission and can say that Article 33
considerations aside, interdicting Haitians at sea is largely a humanitarian mission. Declaring the
overcrowded boats as a manifestly unsafe voyage and repatriating Haitians is less complicated
from a policy standpoint than processing refugees in the US. This is more understanding than the
Bahamas or Dominican Republic who have historically regarded Haitian without benevolence.
The Haitian government has managed the internal displacement of its citizens ineffectively. While
there have been advances in turning camps into communities, the Haitian government has, in some
cases, used the soil underneath camps as a bargaining chip for industrial or economic growth.
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While the Haitian government cannot ‘expel’ its own refugees, it has shown interest in banishing
its own displaced people out of their settlements.

Latin American refugees create widespread issues for all nations in South, Central and North
America because the migration route itself creates protracted displacement. Travelling north to
avoid capture from drug cartels means that refugees must maintain a certain level of invisibility.
This makes it even more difficult for nations to deliver humanitarian aid, process asylum claims
or even create policies to address undetectable ambulatory populations. Regional agreements in
Latin America have garnered acknowledgement, but not resolutions. And for those Latin
Americans that safely reach the border with the US, often are transfused with illegal migrants
requiring accurate vetting. Still perpetuating their displacement, those that are properly identified
as refugees and not illegal aliens are then placed in detention centers while claims are laboriously
processed.

Balancing the State versus the Individual. Jordan has been fundamentally open to refugees from
Syria. However, Jordan faces challenges balancing its own unemployment rates and providing
Syrians with access to jobs and economic development. The Kingdom of Jordan has a duty to its
citizens who have already absorbed Palestinians and two waves of Iraqis into job markets, housing
and social services. The Kingdom of Jordan’s approach with Syrian refugee flows is a stark
example of its self-determination of border control. While UNHCR manages the humanitarian
crisis at ‘the berms,’ Jordan’s sovereignty is both secure and unquestioned. While the humanitarian
crisis along the border continued to grow over the last year, public opinion – both criticisms and
nationalist support – largely focused on discordant national policies across the EU.
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Haiti has a long history of capricious leadership, however development and stability within the
populace has always suffered. Since the 2010 Earthquake and most recent hurricanes, the
desperation of Haitians has become more widely known as NGOs, USAID and the UN have
become permanent fixtures. The government and displaced persons negotiate land-tenure laws that
pit citizen and state against one another. As the seventh anniversary of the earthquake recently
passed, there is little evidence the Haitian government can re-house the displaced, nor can it
construct development plans or preparation strategies for the next environmental disaster. Nations
like the US and other terminuses for Haitian refugees have constructed refugee policies that, while
sympathetic to the desperation of their protracted displacement, still echoes the level of
considerations articulated regarding illegal migrants. The displacement in Haiti can provide one
lesson related to internal displacement. Repair or reconstruction of new communities may be seen
as development rather than aid, however the creation of temporary camps may perpetuate
displacement schemes.

Latin American diaspora is a more nebulous problem, largely because nations across Central and
South America have largely been unable to contain drug cartel hegemony. Traditional and
conceptual tools and policy frameworks have failed either to resolve situations of protracted exile
or to prevent more recent crises – such as displacement from non-government-driven violence.
This too is transforming the protractedness of displacement (Zetter, 2011). The flow of refugees
is seemingly beyond the scope of many Central and South American governments as the drug
cartel influence and violence remains steadfast. While refugee conventions have created some
traction, national security issues prevail. As seen in the past presidential election, border security
and migrant flow from the south has been a divisive issue in the US. The discourse rarely, however,
33

specifically uses the word refugee. Again, the economic impact of undocumented people – and not
humanitarianism – drives policy. The US and Canadian refugee policies fluctuate as conservative
and liberal political climates sway.

My original contention was that refugee agreements have become universal aspirations rather than
enforceable laws or regulations. This is not earthshattering statement as the 1951 Convention
articulated that the articles within did not supersede the laws of any sovereign nation, but rather
articulated the agreed upon intentions of how refugees escaping persecution would be processed
and treated. Further, regional conventions have intended to address regional contexts of
displacement. And I now also contend that nations are aware of the apparent failure to address this
and continue to develop agreements that serve the nation-state. For instance, at a conference cohosted by the govt of Norway and UNHCR in Oslo 2011 over two hundred delegates including
UN and civil society organizations produced The Nansen Principles. The outcome was “build[ing]
on existing norms in international law, and identify the responsibility of local, national and
international actors.” (Koser, 2014, pg. 675). However, in the case examples there is little evidence
The Nansen Principles has afforded any unified progress in reaching durable solutions within the
EU. So as being a signatory nation of international refugee agreements is a statement about
aspirations or intentions, it does not create legal obligations or institutionalized national policies.

Conclusions
Both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol – and nearly every regional policy that follow attempt to provide the international community some level of guidance on processing and care for
refugees. However, after reviewing the three case studies of contemporary protracted displacement
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there is little evidence that a ‘standardized methods’ are practiced. The case studies present two
strategies to avoid refoulement challenges: controlling border crossings and manipulation of
refugee status. And these strategies are implemented regardless of whether or not the host nation
is a signatory of the 1951 or 1967 ‘agreements.’ I reassert that these case studies demonstrate how
national strategies actually perpetuate protracted displacement rather than ease refugee suffering.
States make rational decisions based on issues and values internal to their nations and increasingly
leave refugees in extended statelessness.

The United States, island nations throughout the Caribbean and South America are the primary
destinations for Haitians that choose to leave. The United States’ policies towards Haitians, Syrians
and Latin Americans typify how many nations strategically muddle refugees into other mobility
schemes such economic migrants or illegal immigrants, or link refugees to terrorist groups. In the
case study of Syrians in Jordan, because Jordan accepts Syrians as ‘guests of the Kingdom,’ they
sidestep refugee policies altogether. In all cases, the benefit of this nomenclature strategy avoids
applying universal aspirations altogether.

Perhaps the most prevalent scheme of controlling the mobility of the displaced comes at the border.
While Article 33 of the 1951 Convention specifically prevents the involuntary return or
refoulement of refugees, host nations accurately and rightfully limit borders. In the case of Jordan,
for instance, refoulement is circumvented by effectively moderating the number of Syrians that
enter. In North America, the US already absorbs significant numbers of illegal economic migrants
and now face nationalist-populism and is encouraging literal wall-building policies. In Central and
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South America rampant forced migration driven by drug cartel violence has produced a blurry
understanding of the protracted displacement circumstances.

The balance between the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the displaced individual are also
clear; the state takes priority. Millions of refugees are stuck in camps and cities or abject invisibility
across the global South - many without permanent legal status. They wait in limbo, and do so in
many in detention centers as their status unresolved in protracted displacement. Beyond
humanitarian aid efforts, the primary United Nations UN output in geopolitical terms seems to be
nothing more than updated data and accounting. Many nations in the global north – especially in
the EU – are becoming aware that mobility schemes of displaced populations are becoming more
effective in crossing not just national borders, but regional and continental barriers. As a result,
refugees on the move to seek asylum in the Global North are perceived as security threats and
disruptions to economic stability. State refugee policies are driven by populist interests of selfprotection.
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Appendix A:
Case Study: Internally Displaced Haitians.
A History of Poor Governance, Hurricanes and Refugees. While the immediate cause of
internal protracted displacement in Haiti directly correlates to a series of natural disasters, there
exists a relevant historical perspective that extends back to the nation’s origins. The country's
society remained deeply influenced by socioeconomic patterns established under French rule.
Within Haiti,

those

that

led

the

revolution became the political and
social elite after the war's end. Mulatto
domination of politics and economics
after the revolution created another caste
society, as most Haitians were rural
subsistence farmers. Globally, France’s allies in the burgeoning post-colonial trade routes largely
excluded Haiti from partnerships. Essentially the nation’s opportunity to participate in imports and
exports was shut off. Haiti’s growth was economically compromised even deeper because France
forced it to pay reparations to the former French plantation owners for the loss of their slaves and
plantation properties. It took Haiti until 1947 to pay off the debt for their own freedom, leaving
the country's government impoverished. This directly caused continued political instability.

To that point, Haiti is listed as number 175 out of 178 on Transparency International’s list of most
corrupt countries. (Muir-Wood, 2012, page 113). By the 1970s and 1980s political instability was
widely considered a significant contributor to Haiti’s inability to rebuild infrastructure damaged
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from seasonal hurricanes. Hurricane Gordon for instance, struck Haiti in October 1995 killing over
a thousand people. Gordon also added to the deforestation on mountains and flooded riverside
agricultural towns. (Abbott, Pg. 380). The bottom of Haiti’s society lived along the bottoms of
ravines, where heavy rain runoff added to the already constant flow of sewage. Vast hillsides were
left unstable due to deforestation encouraged heavy storm rain to wash away soil. In the highlands
and river floodplains, villages were unable to maintain subsistence agriculture or the hopes of
regaining crops for international exports.

Haitian refugees were a known population by the 1970s. People tried to escape Haiti not just
because of poverty, but political unrest. While the first Haitians arrived in the US seeking asylum
as early as 1963, they were denied asylum and summarily deported back to Haiti. Between 1961
and 1971 approximately 25,000 legal Haitian immigrants were admitted into the US. Between
1973 and 1991 over 80,000 Haitians that reached – or attempted to reach – the US were asylum
seekers (Charles, pg. 192). The US has allowed Haitian immigrants, but not Haitian asylum
seekers. Duvalier was removed from power in 1987 and “the first democratically elected
government” (Charles, 192) in power in February 1991 with the arrival of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Aristide used military power over Haitians which increased the rate of Haitian departures. The US
had increased its presence in the Caribbean, successfully intercepting 34,000 refugees at sea
(Charles, 192) only to be repatriated back to Haiti before they could arrive on dry soil. The Haitian
immigration office reported that 19,778 cases of “forced repatriation of Haitians by US, Bahamian,
Cuban and Dominican authorities” (Charles, 192). Because asylum in the US can only be claimed
once within the US (uscis.gov), turning refugees back at sea is a less complicated process.
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Those in positions to define who are refugees can manipulate these categories as they fit their own
interests and agendas. Many saw during the 1980s and early 1990s refugee crises created a general
“consensus on the need to advocate for asylum seekers and refugee status for those migrants who
could claim ‘credible fear of persecution’ if they were returned to Haiti” (Charles page 190-191).
Across Haiti, communities were divided politically and the Aristide regime “created the conditions
for a movement of forced migration” (Charles, page 191). The “hegemonic power relationships”
between the United States and Haiti also created challenges both for Haitians in Haiti and Haitians
seeking escape to the US.

Haitians found safety a challenge outside Haiti as well. Bahamians in 1974 and 1978 tried to
remove Haitians who were “hunted down in the streets, imprisoned, beaten then deported” and
“Even for Haitian residents for as long as twenty-five years, there was no security” (Abbott, pg
237). In 1980 during the “Cayo Lobos Tragedy” over one hundred Haitians (men, women
children) tried to land on the Bahama island of Cayo Lobos. The Jeanclaudist Haitian government
declared they did not have the resources to collect their citizens, stating to the Bahamas “Do with
them what you will.” Bahamians tear gassed them, beat them with the butts of rifles and
nightsticks. This was televised by a CBS film crew. All were quickly returned to Haiti (Abbott,
pg. 363). In the early 1990s, during post-coup reprisals against Lavalas and Aristide supporters at
least three thousand Haitians were killed. Reports included torture, mutilations, beatings and
widespread persecution. Anyone found supporting Aristide were humiliated and their genitalia
maimed, leaving many impotent or infertile” (Abbott, pg. 364). Hands chopped off. Women were
robbed and raped, beaten until they miscarried. Life inside Haitian prisons was even darker. One
prisoner was reportedly forced to cut off his own ear by a prison guard. Inside the national
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penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, 85 percent of inmates were political prisoners. By the end of 1992,
just over twenty-nine thousand had been returned to Haiti and fifty-four were accepted into the US
as refugees. (Abbott, pg. 366) In 1993, the US failed to follow through on a public promise to stop
the repatriations and decided that Haitians could only apply for refugee status within Haiti. Even
after Hurricane Gordon and well-documented violence against civilians, Haitians were
“repatriated” to Haiti. On the US Coast Guard webpage that outlines Alien Migrant Interdiction
Operations (AMIO), it describes the movements of Haitians during this timeframe. One paragraph
uses misaligned terms such as asylum claim and migrant, but is unclear how Haitian asylum claims
or repatriation were determined.
“Haitian migrants began increased departures after a 1991 coup in Haiti. These migrants
were processed for asylum claims first on ships, then at Guantanamo Bay Cuba
(GTMO). Those that were identified as leaving for economic reasons were returned to
Haiti. The camp eventually became a magnet for those departing seeking food, shelter,
and a chance to get into the U.S. During this time, the camp at GTMO contained over
12,000 migrants.”
(Source: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp)

The next paragraph simply states a 1992 Presidential order directed the Coast Guard to “enforce
the suspension of the entry of undocumented migrants by interdicting them at sea, and return them
to their country of origin or departure.” This fails to specifically address any Haitians (or Cubans)
as refugees, rather the overarching term migrant is used. A story appearing in Deseret News (1995)
covering the exodus included a report of handcuffed men sobbing and yelling their fears of death
upon return to Aristide-controlled Haiti. The Red Cross in Haiti supplied repatriated Haitians with
a toothbrush and the equivalent of $16.50 and a ride to a bus stop.

The January 2010 Earthquake. Academics such as Muir-Wood, and professionals in
development see Haiti as “so poor and ungoverned” (pg. 114) as the main reason there were no
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effective building codes when the 2010 earthquake struck. In Cité Soleil, home to over two
hundred and fifty thousand, and one of the poorest sections of Haiti was built predominantly with
cement block, and corrugated metal. Houses were built so close that cement roofs would collapse
onto the adjacent home creating a virtual concrete house of cards. According to Abbott one of the
main reasons Haiti faired so much worse than the comparable earthquake in Chile six weeks later,
was largely because Chile was a nation with “good governance, and an infrastructure boasting
earthquake-resistant buildings” (pg. 431-432) Abbott specifically points to the Duvalier era where
environmental decline and rabid deforestation that forced poor farming communities out of
business and into cities. This in turn, created a growth in the already congested urban slums like
Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil. Decades of construction across Haiti was done so without any
adherence to even basic building codes.

Within hours of the earthquake aid began to pour in. Post-Earthquake, Abbott highlights that
NGOs became centers of not just humanitarian aid, but governance as well because Haiti’s
governmental systems were completely circumvented (pg. 433). Looking back, this shift of power
from government to NGO seems inevitable. The earthquake created massive loss of life and
physical property and infrastructure, but also records. “Tax receipts, legal records and land
property deeds were obliterated” (Abbott, pg. 431). Seventy-three of the over three hundred
hospitals were destroyed as were government buildings and police stations. “Overnight, Haiti lost
fifty percent of its Gross National Product” (Abbott, pg. 431). The Préval government had
essentially shut down in the immediate aftermath with even the Presidential palace destroyed.

Within hours of the quake, camps were created in the cities and countryside. Cox and Cox (2016)

50

present a discussion about the military’s humanitarian assistance techniques and approaches –
based on expectations of violence - was itself causing panic. Based on their size and population,
the camps could easily be called tent cities. Many Haitians filled open spaces in Port-au-Prince
such as soccer fields and church yards while ‘Shelter experts’ created plans that were not
consistently implemented. The Haitian government suggested building numerous small camps
instead of a few large ones. Rather than rebuild and recover, Haiti fell deeper into chaos. Many
camps were growing without any control as Haitians continued to flood in (Farmer, pg. 140). By
mid-February, more than one million people were living in almost a thousand camps. But by
housing hundreds of thousands of displaced Haitians, the land itself became a bargaining chip.
There were development plans that included deals with nations as far away from Haiti as South
Korea (Katz, 2013, pg. 180). Often, new factories and government buildings were to be built where
Haitians were living under UN tarps. The term shelter cluster was coined by the United Nations
as though these camps were somehow creating a new understanding of displacement and therefore
needed new language. As Farmer point out “The UNs cluster strategy divided labor into discrete
areas according to its lead agencies: the WHO (World Health Organization) was charged with
coordinating medical aid; the World Food Program, with food aid; and UNICEF, with attending
to children’s needs” (pg. 144). An Internal memo from John Holmes (head of UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA) revealed that one month after the quake there
remained “unmet humanitarian needs, particularly in critical areas such as shelter, other NFIs (nonfood items), and sanitation.” The memo stated “Part of the problem relates to our overall
operational capacity.” (Farmer, pg147) A study conducted by Louise Ivers and her senior aide,
Kim Cullen found that three months after the quake, in Parc Jean-Marie Vincent, more than 40
percent of camp dwellers felt camp conditions were too dangerous for children and women to get
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water at night. Another 7.4 percent were reported having already been attacked” (as cited by
Farmer, pg. 147). Most of the camps created in the weeks after the 2010 earthquake are still in
place.

In the spring of 2016 I, along with other research colleagues, visited various camps and
communities, meeting with residents. Six years after losing their homes these internally displaced
people still struggle to understand their future. And the reality of each camp varied. In the first
camp of approximately two thousand people, we met with their leadership and gained their
perspective about the United Nations, foreign aid and their rights as Haitians. This was a closed
camp with a heavily guarded gate adjacent to a busy urban road. The camp ran up the side of a
rocky hill and was a mix of temporary shelters, called t-shelters with light blue UN tarps showing
signs of age, masonry buildings and wooden shacks. Inside the only building with electricity, we
met the community president – wearing a shirt from International Rescue Committee – and the
rest of the elected leadership. Many introduced themselves and included their title which often
included the word “security.”
From my field notes:
“…One women joined the discussion late. She was a representative for the women in the camp. As
she spoke about the dangers to women at night, some of the men’s body language changed. They
looked away from the circle of people. Looked out the window or turned their heads away.”

And
“Around the perimeter of the main camp other tent neighborhoods of poor Haitians trying to seek
protection and assistance from the camp.”

One thing we learned is that in all of the camps we visited, many Haitians kept their ‘property’
occupied at all times. They understood that this allows them to legally claim land tenure rights to
their plot. Rather than return to their lost homes, they felt that their best opportunity would be to
stay inside the camp on their plot. The next community held roughly eight thousand people in an
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open camp located in a muddy lowland area alongside a main road. There were four toilets. We
passed a tent that had been installed by a religious aid program, but there was no way to clean or
maintain it so it sat unused.

My field notes:
“They told us that the Haitian government’s approach to camps are all about the politics of moving
them out of the land for development. As we looked around a camp of nearly eight thousand
Haitians, to each side of the camp a wall has been built to separate them (contain them?) from a
warehouse development on one side and a new expanse of buildings on the other side. The IDPs
argue that politicians in Haiti are looking to empty the camp in any way necessary to appear
successful politically. One man told a story of how a UN Minister came to the camp in the middle
of the night, with a bullet proof vest and armed troops. “while we were all sleeping” he announced
that the camp residents need to leave the camp.”

Another conversation from the same camp:
“They told us that the IOM (International organization for Migrants) was offering the IDPs the
equivalent of $300USD to move out of the camp and back into town. They report that the money
isn’t enough and is a weak attempt by the local government to escape the responsibility of building
them actual homes. They say that the IOM is threatening to move them out by force and bulldoze
their homes. They say the IDPs don’t want the $300 but want to have a permanent home built at the
camp.”

Wanting to learn a bit more about the government’s development intentions on land where camps
existed, I read Katz’s first-hand reporting from the Haitian earthquake: The Big Truck that Went
By. Inside he tells of a 2011 report from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a component
of the World Bank, which called for the construction of a 2,400-acre site to be developed on the
footprint of the Corail IDP camp. This included an “apparel park,” an industrial park and other
mixed-use development area around new neighborhoods (Katz, pf 184). This development never
came to fruition and Corail continued to grow into one of the largest of the IDP camps. The US
State Department and Haitian government moved their focus north between Cap-Haitian and the
Dominican Border. There was a new plan to build a garment park, this time farther away from
Haiti’s “bureaucrats, displaced squatters and other prying eyes” (Katz, pg. 184). So what the
displaced Haitians reported was accurate; the government of Haiti has sought to develop at least
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some of the lands where their citizens still reside six years after the earthquake. Rather than build
residential developments, they seek industrial development with international partners.

The largest camp we visited was home to an estimated twenty thousand families with a total of
roughly one hundred thousand residents. Gathered along an arid hillside, the open camp had nine
toilet facilities. This camp was formed not by the government of Haiti, but by Haitians who poured
out of the urban areas in the weeks following the quake. Fearing more buildings would collapse
they gathered here. There was nothing built by the Haitian government, the structures were built
by the residents themselves and again ranged from concrete block with metal roofs to sheets and
sticks. They too reported that the Haitian government was unsupportive and provided them little.
After leaving the camp we travelled about ten minutes down the road to a construction site. There,
the Haitian government was building a multi-acre monument. When complete it will have water
features and irrigated greenery to honor the hundreds of thousands lost during the earthquake.
According to what we learned they were buried beneath our feet in a mass gravesite. Somewhat
ironically, an armed guard kept children from the adjacent camp out of the walled compound that
enclosed the area. We could see the adjacent hillside showed the camp was expanding closer to
the monument.

We visited two separate residential developments built by the Haitian government. These were
intended to re-house the displaced people from camps. The first one was about 30min outside PortAu-Prince, alongside a desolate highway. We estimated that less than half the residential units
were occupied. There were fresh water cisterns on roofs, sidewalks and electricity. In the first
community, over two visits with the residents, we learned that the government built the apartment-
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style community and originally rented the homes for $300 per month. However, over the previous
year, the residents say the government began filling the cisterns with salt water and rents increased
to $500. There was no employment nearby and only a few could afford the daily travel into PortAu-Prince for low-paying jobs. The second community was fully occupied and was 20min farther
outside the city. The small single-level homes lined side-walked streets. The community was
located inside a walled and gated perimeter allowing access only through a manned gate. We met
with the community’s elected ‘president’ who outlined the democratically-elected leadership
structure. We learned that the rent for the homes was $300 per month. After three years of paying
rent, residents then fully owned their homes. On a separate trip that same week, we noticed a new
prison had recently been completed. It was within a five or ten-minute drive of the largest camp
and the community where residents complained of rent hikes.

Development in Haiti has seen different points of view long before the earthquake. In The Rainy
Season. Haiti – Then and Now (1989), Wilentz outlines how infrastructure interests have changed
frequently, so it makes sense that there is no ‘one great plan’ for reconstruction and re-housing
those living in protracted displacement situations. Citing work by DeWind and Kinley, Wilentz
states that international assistance interests “virtually forced the Haitian government into accepting
their export-led proposals for growth” (Wilentz, Pg. 273). Along with other international pressures,
this dictated that the Haitian government should decrease expenditures on human resources. This
was driven largely by the World Bank in an attempt for Haiti to spend put forth “less emphasis
should be placed on social objectives with increased consumption” and focus on GDP-driven
expenditures (Wilentz, pg. 274). Considering Haiti’s history of weak governance, it is not
completely surprising that infrastructure development, NGO-centric post-disaster power bases and
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disillusionment of political leadership all fail to effectively address protracted internal
displacement of the Haitians. Without political cohesion, social cohesion fails as well. As stated
by Zephyr et al (2011); “The literature suggests that it is likely that disasters can depress levels of
social trust, unless during the disaster citizens work together to help each other out.” (pg. 27). It
has been widely viewed that when the disaster the magnitude found in Haiti hits, the expectation
is that political capital will fall in the aftermath. (Zephyr et al, 2011; Cox and Cox, 2009; Helliwell
and Wang, 2010; and Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez, 2002). This lack of faith in post-disaster
reconstruction can be seen in the increased refugee flow out of Haiti.

One other contributing ingredient to contemporary internal displacement is the problematic
relationship between Haiti and the only nation it shares a land border, the Dominican Republic.
Again turning to Abbott (2011), Haitians who try to leave by foot face the reality that “forcible
repatriation was always around the corner. The glaring exception being “in the Dominican
Republic, where enslavement was a much likelier hazard” (pg. 240). According to testimony from
hundreds who escaped, Dominican soldiers routinely rounded up illegal Haitians for forced labor
in the sugar fields. This constitutes the core of the Dominican economy. Many more stories like
this were corroborated by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society.

In the post-earthquake reality, the route out of Haiti by sea is life-risking behavior. Many aim for
islands to the north along the Antilles, while others head west toward Central and South America.
According to a recent report (Semple, 2014), four to six thousand Haitians were thought to be
making their way north by land starting as far south as Brazil. Haitians seeking refuge in North
America is nothing new. In The Plight of Haitian Refugees (Miller, 2014) the author points out
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Haitians have been settling in US and Canada since Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier. Many have
been dying at sea. But Miller also argues that their “ambiguous legal status” also promotes further
health and employment issues only perpetuates the lack of human rights for displaced Haitians.

If the international community at large
has left Haitian refugees on the
periphery of assistance and protection,
the United States is at the front line. The
most likely destination for Haitian
refugees has always been the US.
Therefore, it is not surprising that US
refugee policy towards Haitians has been highly criticized. After the 2010 earthquake the US
suspended deportations of Haitians stating that “sending Haitians back to the country at a time of
great instability would put their lives at risk” (as cited by Semple, 2016). About a year later,
however, US officials partly resumed deportations, focusing on people convicted of serious crimes
or those considered a threat to national security. On Sept 22 of 2016, the US resumed deportations
because as DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson stated “the situation in Haiti has improved sufficiently” (as
cited by Denvir, 2016). Soon after, Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti and the US again reconsidered
an increase in deportations.
Temporary protected status (TPS): The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate a foreign country for TPS due to
conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country's nationals from returning safely, or in certain
circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately. The Secretary may designate
a country for TPS due to the following temporary conditions in the country:
-Ongoing armed conflict (such as civil war)
-An environmental disaster (such as earthquake or hurricane), or an epidemic
-Other extraordinary and temporary conditions
Source: uscis.gov
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An article in Salon.com found that “More than anything, the new policy seems directed at
stemming the entry of Haitians streaming up from Brazil to the U.S.-Mexico border. Haitians had
flocked to Brazil after the earthquake to seek economic opportunity but that country’s economy is
now in a downward spiral.” (Devir, 2016). As with many other election year issues surrounding
foreign nationals entering the US, rhetoric around refugees fluctuated. Before the completion of
the election, the outgoing administration emphasized “asylum law would continue to apply to
newly arriving Haitians. A migrant who feared returning to Haiti because of the threat of
persecution or torture would be interviewed to determine whether that fear was credible. If an
immigration officer determined it was, the immigrant could apply for asylum” (Semple).
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is yet another ‘status’ bestowed on refugees.

58

Appendix B:
Case Study: Displaced Latin Americans across the Americas.
Regional Reactions to Protracted Displacement. With few exceptions, Central and South
American Nations are signatory members of both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. By the
1980s refugees fleeing civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and to repressive
dictatorships in South America created a growing problem across the continent. As a result, ten
Latin American nations created the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. This agreement, still
in place today, establishes a protection framework and is incorporated in the laws of some nations.
Significant to the problems of the region, The Cartagena Agreement opened the definition of
refugee to include people fleeing “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public
order” (migrationpolicy.org). It also attempts to define minimum standards of refugee treatment
and build international cooperation for humanitarian protection. Some of the language found in
the 1984 Cartagena Agreement was later adopted by European Union (migrationpolicy.org). Of
note, while the declaration expanded the consideration of who could be considered a refugee under
the 1951 Convention, it still required the burden of proof on claimants to prove real risk of harm
before protection is offered.

Historically, Latin American refugees are very diversified in their composition. They comprise
both urban and rural refugees, families and individuals, educated and uneducated. Many Latin
American refugees are political refugees who fled their countries of origin, such as Cuba,
Argentina, Paraguay and Chile in fear of persecution. Significant numbers found asylum in other
South American states such as Venezuela or farther away in Spain (Beyer, 1981). Central America
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has become a major refugee-producing area as a result of civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
Well over one million persons have been displaced by fear, violence and misery in Central America
in the past decade (unhcr.org). Large numbers of displaced people have remained within their own
country's borders, but many more live hidden or in exile elsewhere. This flow of refugees increased
in the 1980s. At the time, Kliot
(1987)

reported

the

following

numbers of refugees around Latin
America: Costa Rica, seven thousand
refugees,
Honduras,

mostly

Nicaraguans;

seventy

thousand

refugees from Nicaragua and El
Salvador;

Nicaragua,

eighteen

thousand refugees, mostly Salvadorans; and Guatemala, seventy thousand refugees from El
Salvador. (Kliot, 1987, p118). By 1985 only about seven-thousand of these Central American
refugees had returned to their home countries. The recent changes of government in Honduras,
Guatemala, Haiti and Costa Rica may encourage more to return. Mexico, with more than one
hundred and seventy five thousand refugees, mostly Salvadorans and Guatemalans, holds the
heaviest burden of refugees in this part of the world (Kliot, 1987, p118). These numbers have
changed in the last thirty years, but this demonstrates that the history of the overall situation has
not. Refugees throughout the region ebb and flow, escaping not just internal conflicts, but
increasingly from drug cartel violence.

Throughout the 1990s growing insecurity and conflict in which the Mexican army and local police
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intervened, further displaced thousands of civilians in Mexico (Leal, 2016, pg. 47). So in this
example of displacement, it must be acknowledged that violence-driven protracted displacement
is fueled not just by violence between cartels, but the wars and interventions from governments
who attempt to control the cartels. According to Zetter (2011), in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the cessation of intrastate violence and restoration of peace in Central America provided the basis
for a somewhat “fragile reconciliation process” (pg. 4) between political groups. This created a
space for some people to return from their displaced places. Focusing on El Salvador and
Guatemala, Zetter used this timeframe of people returning from displacement as a case study to
glean some lessons and contrast to current situations. While I do not think he helps address Article
33 (repatriation), or how national policies apply, it does give some insight into the UNHCR vision
of how decreased violence can encourage displaced persons to return home ‘voluntary, free from
coercion.’

Both refugee migration out of, and internal displacement within Columbia increased in the early
2000s as clashes between different government and non-government military factions fought for
control of Medellín. Columbia and neighboring nations were able to do little more than
acknowledge that people were being displaced. Specifically, Columbia’s national public policy,
found in Law 397, gave a wide definition of internally displaced persons, as any person “…forced
to migrate within the national territory abandoning their place of residence…” due to “internal
armed conflict, internal disturbances or tension, generalized violence, massive violations or human
rights” (as cited by Mojica, 2016, pg. 91). Again, there was little the government of Columbia
could actually provide for displaced persons, even those who lost their homes or safety by the
actions of the Columbian government.
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The relationship between protracted displacement in Latin America and criminal violence from
the drug trade has been corroborated in multiple areas of policy and politics. Vanderbilt
University’s Latin American Public Policy Opinion Project, for instance, found that thirteen to
fifteen percent of Mexicans have changed their residence due to a fear of crime (LAPOP, 2012
and 2013). And Mexico is widely considered to be at the crux of growing protracted displacement
from cartel violence. Despite this, only two of Mexico’s thirty-two states have adopted some kind
of local legislation that references displacement of any kind. Leal (2016) concludes that three
factors have contributed to the increase of violence and insecurity in Mexico; the security strategy,
the competition between cartels for control of smuggling routes, and smaller groups controlled by
cartels who compete for territory. Like in Columbia, displacement in Mexico and other states is
caused by violence between cartels and the clashes they have with state forces. Being a ‘gateway’
into the US and Canada, Mexican violence increases continued protracted displacement: internally
displaced Mexicans and refugees from farther south who attempt to escape enslavement through
Mexico. Those that are escaping slavery and forced-labor in the narcotics industry do so as covertly
as possible, living in the shadows to avoid recapture. In presenting her research in Mexico, Leal
(2016) makes a somewhat cheeky ‘chicken-and-egg’ anecdote (pg. 49) when considering the
causes of ‘hidden’ forced displacement – asking if violence against forced migrants causes the
migrants to become more discrete in their movements, or if their inherence invisibility increases
the violence against them. She concludes that either way, government agencies in Mexico have
“tended to minimize or ignore it, as it exposes lack of foresight concerning the humanitarian
consequences” of their strategies (pg. 50). So I see a sort of ‘cyclical logic’ to all of this; Escaping
cartel capture requires an intentional covertness of displacement, thereby decreasing the visibility
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of displacement and fueling a state’s lack of acknowledging the refugee population. And finally,
the state’s lack of attention to the issue only emboldens cartels to continue enslavement and
violence against the invisible population.

Acknowledging the problem in 2004,
the nations in the region committed to
“promoting the [UNHCR] Guiding
Principles at a regional level” (Leal,
2016, pg. 59). This was part of a larger
gathering of academics, international
organizations and officials from across
Latin America. There was a widespread agreement that there was a need to “defend, protect and
monitor IDPs” (pg. 59). However, Leal concludes that while there has been some progress, most
nations in the region still fail to fully acknowledge the wide-scape displacement. Most Latin
American nations have yet to complete any significant quantitative or qualitative studies that
would disaggregate displacement by age, sex or location. Mexico, like many other regional nations
lack the ‘conceptual, legal and institutional framework” to respond to the humanitarian issue (Leal,
pg. 62). Serna and Durieux (2016) also conclude that, the idea of someone being a victim is directly
connected to their likelihood of being displaced. In their research, as in the public discourse in
North America and Latin American nations, “those affected by criminal groups have effectively
been made second-rate citizens” in Columbia (pg. 126). They find that in Mexico by comparison,
progress still remains to be seen. This is largely because Mexico still fails to recognize that
displacement “can be an independent human rights violation” (pg. 126). This contributes to the

63

continued invisibility of the issue of protracted displacement.

It should be noted that some steps have been made. The 2014 Brazil Declaration and its ten-year
Plan of Action is one such movement. This was a follow on from the 1984 convention and is the
first international agreement that recognized rampant organized crime as a cause of large-scale
displacement (Cantor, 2016). Cantor concludes that the “silent wave of forced migration” is a
result the “epidemic of violence” (pg. 44) in nations with rampant drug cartel attacks.

Displacement Beyond Latin America. The humanitarian treatment of those living in protracted
displacement situations is a growing global concern and has compelled nations to reconsider how
their local law enforcement officers handle refugee issues. Many who make it as far as North
America face new challenges – as do the governments of US and Canada. Along the border with
Mexico, the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas are proving grounds for US
refugee policies relating to drug violence. In 2009, the US State Department listed Mexico as one
of 17 nations “making insufficient efforts” to stop the flow of refugees. However, as in Europe
and the Middle East, the acceptance of refugees has become so pervasive, it is seen as a collective
goods problem for those nations that absorb them (Goldstein and Pevehouse). So, how Canada and
the US approach the issues of displacement, they too must work between the idea of refugee rights
and the needs of the state.

According to the Canadian Council on Refugees, Canada “belatedly signed the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees,” eighteen years after it was adopted by the United Nations.
Since becoming a party to the Refugee Convention, Canada has “gained the enviable reputation of
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being a world leader in protecting refugees” (ccrweb.ca). In 1970, Canada issued the Guideline for
Determination of Eligibility for Refugee Status, thereby creating a national protocol for refugees.
Currently, Canada is home to refugees mainly from Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.
Since 2004 the United States and Canada have shared The Safe Third Country Agreement, which
allows a smoother processing of refugee claims from claimants seeking entry into Canada from
the US.

The current Canadian immigration and population policies were officially established in the 1970s.
They include the promotion of Canada's demographic, economic, social and cultural goals; family
reunion; nondiscrimination; and the fulfilment of Canada's international obligations in relation to
refugees. According to the Migration Policy Institute, Canada's response to revolutions in Central
America has made it “a natural haven for those displaced by the political upheaval”
(migrationpolicy.org). In the 1980s, Canada supported relief efforts in the region, and enacted a
variety of measures to protect the displaced. Specifically, through the UNHCR Canada facilitated
the immigration of Guatemalan refugees living in Costa Rica and Mexico into the provinces.
Between 1982 and 1987, Canada admitted fifteen thousand refugees from Central America, the
majority of them Salvadoran (migrationpolicy.org). In later years, however, Canada has passed a
series of bills to reform the immigration and refugee bureaucracy, exert better control of the border,
and discourage "frivolous claims" (migrationpolicy.org) of illegal migrants seeking unfounded
refugee status.

While Latin American refugees were not solely the target of these concerns, the so-called "border
rush" of the late 1980s contributed to the bias towards immigration (May, 2017). Public opinion
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expressed a growing resistance to more generous refugee policies and by 1988 Canada passed a
bill that promised to “streamline the processing of asylum claims, eliminate the backlog, and
facilitate deportation” May, 2017). Canada not only shares the world’s longest shared international
border, but also a thousand-mile-deep physical buffer that affords some assuagement in regards to
Latin American refugees. Like other nations, Canadian refugee policies and their approach to
protracted displacement or the acceptance of refugees, still needs to accommodate state interests.

In just the first weeks of 2017 it ostensibly seems within the United States both state and federal
law policies regarding refugees from the Middle East and the southern border will be reconsidered.
This will be played out nationally and on the international stage. Going back a decade of Latin
American refugees, a 2008 article in The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth includes
a first-hand account of a Mexican refugee’s escape from drug violence. After successfully entering
the US to seek asylum, they were questioned and loaded back into vehicles for delivery back into
Mexico, and into the arms of the drug cartel they sought to escape (Bhabha and Schmidt). The
inability to properly recognize their claim led to an on-the-spot deportation. Claims of harassment
of legal Mexican-Americans by law enforcement, even if circumstantial, create an incentive for
internal assessments of law enforcement personnel awareness of subtle nuances in the Mexican
Refugee situation. Even in cases where illegal migration exists, law enforcement’s treatment of
Mexicans in the US remains a politically charged issue. Elsewhere in the US for instance, sheriffs
were videotaped as they “chased down a truckload of Mexican illegals and administered a savage
beating” (Grieder). Had they been asylum seekers, the same actions of the sheriffs would have
been more contentious.
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Beyond national policies, there are non-government organizations who, intentionally or
unintentionally, become significant actors in relation to Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. Strain
on government agencies have given to more self-proclaimed law enforcement ‘volunteers.’
Midnight on the Line records the nightly activities of multiple loosely organized quasi-military
groups that are “free from the constraints of jurisdiction” and are not controlled by laws that “create
the paralysis” in government agencies (Gaynor). These groups are well armed, well-intentioned,
but not necessarily well-versed in refugee policies or asylum law.

A journalist who embedded himself with paramilitary forces along the US/Mexico border
discovered the nuances of how international refugee law, refoulement and protracted displacement
is executed. Bauer (2016) met with people connected with what has been widely known as The
Minuteman Project. Self-descriptions of what they are doing ranges from “protecting the US
southern border from undocumented immigrants” to “hunting Mexicans” (page 27). When
approached by state police and asked their mission, one replied “We’re just being the eyes and
ears of the Border Patrol, basically” (pg. 20) and spoke of the partnership between the Border
Patrol agents and his organization. Another interviewee stated that the US Border Patrol provides
their team with “very useful information to help make our ops better” (page 37). They struggle
with the limits of power they have as civilians rather than government officials. Another lamented
“I wish I coulda picked those motherfuckers off. If only we didn’t have our hands so fucking tied”
(pg. 32). Throughout the article, there was no differentiating between illegal economic migrants
or refugees escaping violence. Rather, the approach from the volunteers along the border, was to
stop all crossings.
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To assist in managing the many laws at the state and federal level, the US Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) created training designed to help navigate the many legal nuances
of refugee laws. The training is centered around international refugee law and the US role in worldwide refugee protection. Topics include fraud identification, asylum evaluation, and national
security concerns. Courses include International Human Rights Law, Credible Fear, Sources of
Authority, Definition of a Refugee, Guidelines for Children’s asylum Claims, and UNHCR and
Concepts of International Protection (uscis.gov). This training is not available to the volunteers
along the border, but only government agencies.

Some refugees do safely cross the border and are processed for asylum claims. Most state
lawmaker’s goals for Mexican refugees is for them to wait in camps until they can return to Mexico
(Alden and Carpenter). But again, they face another form of containment: US Detention Centers.
People close to the issue, such as former House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul,
are referring to them as refugee camps (Ziamov, 2014). In the same article by Ziamov, a county
judge stated that these camps are not solving the refugee crisis, and that "These people don't need
to be chased and apprehended; they are looking for border control so they can turn themselves in
and be documented” (Ziamov). Ultimately, the border of the US often leads to deportation.

What often drives these policies, which frequently change, relates to security and limiting the
expansion of cartel violence into the US. And proponents of harsher policies point to strong
evidence. One US city is referred to as the “Mexican version of Mogadishu” because it is now
under complete control of competing drug warlords (Gaynor). State police, not just border agents,
routinely come in direct contact with drug violence and those that seek to escape as refugees into
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the US. There are well-documented cartel threats against US law enforcement personnel
(Carpenter). Citing the presence of cartel members following refugees across the border, some in
the US fear driving on roads, attending school, or even being seen in public. “Mexican families
fleeing the violence have moved here or just sent their children, and authorities and residents say
gangsters have followed them across the Rio Grande” (as cited by Carpenter). States like Texas
have sought stronger federal policies to control the border, keeping the displaced south of the
border and the return of those who make it north.

69

Appendix C:
Case Study: Displaced Syrians in Jordan
During and after WWII, refugees fled Eastern Europe; significantly into Western Europe, but
others into the Middle East and elsewhere. Many women and children from Bulgaria, Croatia,
Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia found refuge in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine (Miltimore, 2016).
These destinations were created as part of a program called MERRA (Middle East Relief and
Refugee Administration). MERRA, an idea of the British government, built partnerships from
organizations such as the International Migration Service, the International Red Cross, and the
Near East Foundation. There were other European refugees and camps in the Middle East as well.
For instance, a Washington Post article reported that several hundred thousand people from Poland
settled in Iran between 1939 and 1941 as they fled persecution from the regimes of Stalin and
Hitler. As German and Italian troops occupied Greece, tens of thousands of people fled by sea to
refugee camps in the Middle East.

But what of intra-regional refugees? The borders of Middle East nations have been drawn and
redrawn as Empires have risen and fallen. As Migdal (2004) observes, borders in this region “have
been contingent on varying historical circumstances, rather than being immutably rock-like” (pg.
5) lending a somewhat less-meaningful presence in the cultures of the Middle East. The Sykes–
Picot Agreement in 1916, for instance, was negotiated largely between Britain and France. The
goal was at least partially to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, but created new borders for other
nations. These changes likely had little significance to the independent craftsmen and traders who
continued their routes between market cities. Again at the end of WWII more lines were redrawn
in the sands of the Middle East - often arbitrarily dividing Arabs and Persians, Sunni and Shi’ite
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Muslims, Christians, all while creating new national and cultural identities. Over a thirty-year
period, new borders of Iraq, Syria, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
were all created.

The two post-war periods can be largely characterized as times when Europeans drew lines in the
Middle East sands – and tried to create new meaning in those lines. As a result, traditional social
and familial networks shaped migration and inter-mixing patterns of people within the Levant far
more prolifically than in other parts of the globe. Dorai (2014) argues that in this regional context,
because there has been a significant history of cross-border movement that to “make the distinction
between forced and voluntary migration [is] not relevant” (pg. 127). To that point, Jordan has
been a haven for Muslim refugees and uprooted people. The historical narrative of Jordan’s
refugees and migrants starts with the early Circassians, Chechens, and Armenians who settled in
the territory at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by a small number of Lebanese Shiites
who fled Lebanon as a result of sectarian in 1917. After 1948 and 1967 wars, waves of Palestinians
refugees doubled the country’s population. More recently a significant number of Iraqis arrived as
a result of the Gulf Wars 1991-2003; most returned back to Iraq eventually.

The inception of the Syrian Civil War is largely considered a direct result of the 2011 Arab Spring.
Conflicts in urban areas escalated when President Assad repressed a civil revolt. One assessment
of the Syrian conflict includes the word “convoluted” and stating “The conflict has created the
most complex humanitarian aid problems of our time” (Muir-Wood p158-163). The UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs declared it a Level 3 Emergency that has created “an
entire generation of unemployed, uneducated Syrians…” (Muir-Wood P159). In the areas of
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conflict, reports find that hospitals will not display the organizational logos of their international
partners for fear of reprisal. Syrians remaining in Syria have problems accessing basic health care
and has led to the first polio outbreak in the nation in fifteen years.

The risks to civilians arguably reached its height in 2013. Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors
without Borders) reported over treating three thousand patients displaying "neurotoxic symptoms"
at hospitals it supported (bbc.com). Despite initial denials by the Syrian government, news outlets
like The Guardian, Associated Press, and the BBC produced the initial first-hand accounts as they
became available. Eventually the world became aware of the Syrian government forces under the
leadership of Assad launched chemical weapons attacks on two Damascus suburbs. Clearly the
Syrian government was seeking dominance over its population - choosing security over human
rights. As a result, there was a significant increase in Syrian refugees crossing the nation’s borders
in nearly all directions. New ‘actors’ joined the Syria conflict and civilians were caught between
the Assad government, the al-Nusra Front, The Free Syrian Army, Hezbollah, Syrian Kurds and
ISIS all of whom receive support or supplies from interests within the US, Russia, Turkey Saudi
Arabia and Qatar (time.com). By November 2015, the UNHCR reported that over a four million
Syrian "persons of concern” both inside out of Syria. While many Syrians have travelled north into
the EU, North America and even Australia, for this examination, I will focus on those that aim for
Jordan.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that by 2016 over two hundred
thousand people have been killed in the ongoing conflict, including over sixty thousand civilians
killed by Assad’s military forces. Many of the world’s largest and most influential nations slowly
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began to take notice, but UN-backed humanitarian interventions were largely denied by Assad
who asserted the Syrian government would provide assistance to injured or displaced. Depending
on perspective, the Syrian Civil war was considered either a significant humanitarian tragedy
where civilians were being oppressed by their government, or it was the unfortunate result of a
sovereign nation exercising a strategy to quell government overthrow by rebel forces.

Though the use of cellular phones and social media, Syrian refugees have made mobility decisions
based on the first-person reporting of their countrymen who left before them. All Syrians are aware
that returning to their home nation – and thereby satisfying a ‘durable solution’ – is wholly perilous
for the foreseeable future. Those who chose travel into the EU do so knowing that destination
likely includes the necessity to be covert in their movement to avoid being “subjected to
discrimination, human rights abuses, political oppression and/or a lack of sustainable livelihoods”
(Bloch, Sigona and Zetter, pg. 5). Further, they point to those who have engaged the EU asylum
system as being the most at-risk because refusal can lead to deportation.

Syrian displacement in Jordan has created a wealth of academic discourse surrounding refugees,
urban displacement and the study of refugee camps. Because of the scope of displacement, and the
type of displacement outside of camps, there has been significant consideration of how Syrians
have impacted the Kingdom of Jordan. Research from the Fakih and Marrouch (2015) specifically
tackles the topic of Syrian economic impacts in host nations. They find the economic pressures on
Jordan’s economy caused by the influx of Syrian refugees are substantial. Their research presented
that by 2015, the total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan was over six hundred thousand 630,000,
but the UNHCR’s numbers were over one million. Regardless, they found that in 2013 the

73

Kingdom of Jordan carried the burden of $81.4 million enrolling over seventy thousand Syrian
children in public schools (Fakih and Marrouch 2015). The funding needed to enroll Syrian
students and to maintain the infrastructure for local students reached $257 million in 2015 (as cited
by Fakih and Marrouch, 2015). Jordan’s government has also spent $168 million on basic health
services for refugees. Available figures regarding infrastructure costs indicate an estimated $62
million per year is needed to cover the additional demand to carry the continued influx of Syrian
refugees.

Of the Syrians in Jordan, twenty percent are living in refugee camps located in or near Za'atari,
Marjeeb al-Fahood, Cyber City and Al-Azraq (unhcr.org). Historically, Jordanians and Syrians are
culturally similar and many have relatives in common. This is significant to this case study because
Jordan has used this to create opportunities for Syrians to live outside the formal camp systems.
Roughly eighty percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan reside outside camps in urban settings or
rural informal communities (Al Akash, 2015, pg. 48 and Kelberer, 2015). The Kingdom of Jordan
has allowed that if Syrian refugees are able to establish family ties to a Jordanian, they are then
allowed to live outside the Azraq camp in an informal community and build homes. Around the
camp, aid agencies have centralized their distribution of resources, including a school for Syrian
children.

In June of 2016, working with colleagues from the US and French academic research community,
I visited one such informal Syrian community approximately 5km from the Azraq camp. The
community was approximately 1.5hrs from Amman across a flat and barren landscape broken only
by the occasional wadi or low slope. Between the populated area outside the city and the small
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town of Azraq, the only significant construction was a large modern Jordanian military compound
and a police training center. The road contains at least three police checkpoints. An informal
community of approximately five hundred Syrians are adjacent to a military installation. This is
presumably where some military aircraft flying into Syrian war zones originate from. Across the
road from the air force base the informal community of a few hundred Syrians lived in small
structures made of cement block and scavenged materials. We met with one family and learned
the details of their particular displacement.

From my field notes:
House has been built in stages as money is earned through distant work in construction or herding.
The husband described a problem with a structure near his home that housed goats and chickens.
The nephew in the adjacent home complained to the land owner (another relative) so not only did
he have to remove the structure sell off the goat. Loss of full investment – the goat was “like a bank
account” because he bought it young and would have been able to sell the milk and/or meat for
higher profit if he kept it longer. This cost time and money to relocate/rebuild. He is considering
moving his family to another location. He would have to save up money to buy a plot of land rather
than continue to ‘rent’ this one from relative. To be able to afford a plot, it would have to be a less
desirable plot than the one they are in now. He would not be able to sell the home he has constructed
because it is not on land he owns.*

And:
They presented a small black canvas bag that carried what was left of their Syrian documents such
as birth certificates and UNHCR cards for each family member. Smallest child was born in Syria
while the war was raging, so no Syrian documentation could be made. That child had another card
issued in Jordan in lieu of Syrian documentation. The relationship the Syrian had with the French
academic researcher also may have adverse effects. The husband said that others in the community
might assume that he was receiving extra aid or favors from the researcher in exchange for talking
to him. Before leaving Azraq, the researcher visited a local NGO director to see if she can
communicate that the owner is not benefitting from the relationship, and that he will make visits to
neighbors in the future to ensure that no perception of favoritism. He stated that he has met with
other families in the community as well, but will work to maintain impartiality.
*Researcher’s Note: Approximately a month after we left Jordan, because of the dispute with the neighbor, they were forced
to leave the community and they lost all of the investment that they put into the construction of the home – which was now
occupied by the neighbor who had the complaint

Syrians living outside camps in towns and cities tens of thousands are in “substandard shelters”
(Kelberer, 2016) where aid agencies put their efforts into basic shelter needs and developing the
housing market for refugees (Kelberer). According to the 2015 shelter response plan, the UNHCR
worked with the Kingdom of Jordan to increase construction of more housing units. This presents
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a complication in non-camp displacement schemes in that it too often requires resources for shelter
construction. In Jordan, any optic that suggests Syrians are receiving more assistance than
Jordanians – either by international aid or the Jordanian government – has created social
disharmony. Especially when considering the preexisting Jordanian unemployment rate and
Amman’s urban infrastructure needs. The Kingdom of Jordan has expanded and retracted housing
projects over the past two years. Those Syrians who are unable to obtain employment or aid are
increasingly returning to Syria as the conflict continues.

Not all Syrians ever make it into Jordan, however. Many are held outside Jordan in a shelter
community along the Syrian border at Rukban. This remote location in the remote eastern region
of the border is highly problematic for humanitarian aid agencies. According the UNHCR, there
were roughly three hundred shelters in 2015, but by July of 2016 the number had grown to over
six thousand and just two months later, increased to over eight thousand shelter structures and still
growing. Aid officials refer to the makeshift refugee camp - across a sand embankment near the
triangle where the Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi borders meet - as "the berm" (aljazeera.com). As
Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged
nations in Europe and ‘the west’ to
help Jordan transfer an estimated
seventy thousand Syrians stranded
on the Kingdom’s border. The
Kingdom of Jordan has used this
access point as a way to regulate the
flow of Syrian refugees into the
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country. In the past Jordan addressed the refugees outside their border as an “international
problem” and according to one statement by a Jordanian official “Our borders remain a sealed
military zone, and addressing the issue of those Syrians stranded in the no-man’s land is not
Jordan’s problem” (Ghazal and Malkawi, 2016). Jordanian officials have put the number of those
stranded at the border at more than 100,000, but there are reports of Syrians leaving the makeshift
camp back to their homes. Exact numbers of refugees at the border fluctuate by date and reporting
source, however satellite images readily available online demonstrate the scope and desperation
of the situation.
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